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A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of 
the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when 
matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the 
research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to 
teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he 
wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In 
this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market 
sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the 
extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of 
core stable coalitional matchings. 
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Both hedonic coalition formation and matching models have been used to
study a wide range of real-life situations. While the coalition formation
literature focuses on the formation of groups on one side of a market ￿gov-
ernment formation, athletes forming teams, students forming student groups,
researchers forming research teams, medical professionals forming practices ￿
the matching literature investigates the ￿matching￿of entities on both sides
of a market, e.g., students choosing colleges, researchers choosing universi-
ties, patients choosing medical centers, medical interns choosing hospitals,
etc. Many of these situations are, however, intrinsically interrelated: student
groups and research teams when matched form universities; athletes form
teams who match with a team of managers to form a sport club; and medical
practitioners together with their patients comprise hospitals. For this reason,
in this paper we integrate coalition formation and matching problems into
a novel framework, which we call a coalitional matching. This allows us to
analyze stability in two-sided matching problems where agents on each side
of the market simultaneously form coalitions and ￿match￿to coalitions on
the other side.
Our work is immediately related to the literature on two-sided matching
problems, where agents on one side of the market are matched to institutions
on the other side, ￿rst de￿ne by Gale and Shapley (1962). Their seminal con-
tribution spurred a vast body of literature (for a thorough review, see Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)). Among the key contributions, we note Shapley and
Shubik (1972) and Crawford and Knoer (1981) who extend Gale and Shap-
ley￿ s framework to a transferable utility setting; Kelso and Crawford (1982)
who provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of core stable allocations;
and Blair (1988) who proves that the set of stable matching is a lattice under
a suitable ordering. More recently, Hat￿eld and Milgrom (2005) incorporate
contracts in the analysis.
In this line of research it has also been recognized that agents￿preferences
2over matchings may depend not only on the institutions they are matched
with, but also on the other agents that are matched to the same institu-
tion, i.e., their colleagues. For example, the early study by Roth (1984), and
the recent one by Klaus and Klijn (2005), investigate many-to-one match-
ing problems in the presence of couples on the agent side of the market.
In these models, however, the coalitions, i.e., the couples, are exogenously
given. Dutta and Mass￿ (1997) take the analysis one step further and study a
many-to-one matching model in which agents￿preferences are lexicographic
and are de￿ned over all institutions and all subsets of colleagues. These
authors, however, restrict their analysis to situations in which institutions￿
preferences over agents satisfy a substitutability property, an assumption
which might not be applicable to many real-life situations in which there are
complementarities between agents as argued most recently by Pycia (2007).
Pycia (2007) and Revilla (2007) move away from the lexicographic prefer-
ences assumption in the many-to-one matching problem with peer e⁄ects.
In this respect, their contributions can be regarded as hedonic coalition for-
mation problems with heterogeneous sets of actors: a set of institutions and
a set of agents; and a restriction on the coalition structures such that a
coalition may contain at most one institution. In a related piece of work,
Echenique and Yenmez (2007) propose an algorithm to ￿nd a core stable
matching, when it exists, in the general many-to-one matching problem with
peer e⁄ects. To conclude this brief overview of the literature, we would like
to mention that Dutta and Mass￿ (1997), Pycia (2007), and Revilla (2007)
all contain, under di⁄erent names, a condition that imposes a degree of com-
monality of players￿preferences over groups. As it will turn out, the spirit
of commonality of players￿preferences will be important for the analysis in
this paper, too.
In this paper we depart from the existing literature, most notably, by
allowing at the same time coalition formation on both sides of the market
and matching between two coalitional entities. Throughout the paper we
3illustrate our concepts by considering a two-sided matching problem where
students may form student groups and researchers may collaborate within
research teams who when matched form universities. We assume that each
researcher has preferences over research teams he would like to work in (and
thus, a research team formation game is well de￿ned) and over student groups
he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over
groups of students she wants to study with (and thus, a student group forma-
tion game is well de￿ned, too) and over groups of researchers she would like
to learn from. In this setup, we study the existence of core stable coalitional
matchings.
In our model, we consider lexicographic preference pro￿les as they allow
us to clearly demarcate the coalition formation and matching aspects of the
problem. Within this broad category, a ￿rst possibility is to assume that
the agents￿preferences over groups on one market side dictate their overall
preferences over universities. In this case, if the market side is the same for
all agents, then the existence of core stable coalitional matchings is deter-
mined by the existence of core stable partition of the agents on that side of
the market. If, on the other hand, it coincides with an agent￿ s own market
side, then the existence of core stable coalitional matchings is determined
by the existence of core stable partitions of students and researchers into
student groups and research teams, respectively. If students judge universi-
ties according to their corresponding teaching teams and researchers judge
universities according to their corresponding student groups, then a common
ranking property (cf. Farrell and Scotchmer (1988)) assures the existence
of core stable coalitional matchings. Another possibility to induce agents￿
preferences over universities is to assume that priority is given to groups on
one of the market sides and then, in case of indi⁄erence, groups on the other
market side also play a role. Depending on whether agents give priority to
groups from one and the same side, their own side or the opposite market
side, we show that the existence of core stable coalitional matchings requires
4appropriate selections from the following four properties. The ￿rst one is the
existence of core stable coalition structures for the coalition formation games
on separate market sides.1 The second property is the total balancedness of
the corresponding coalition formation games (cf. Bloch and Diamantoudi
(2007)) requiring each restriction of these games to have a non-empty core.
Although this condition is quite restrictive, many of the su¢ cient conditions
for non-emptiness of the core of hedonic games guarantee that the game is
in fact totally balanced (e.g., the common ranking property of Farrell and
Scotchmer (1988) and the top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001)).
The third and fourth properties that play a role in our analysis make the ex-
istence of core stable coalitional matchings dependent on whether individual
preferences over groups are strict or not, and on whether these individual
preferences respect a common ranking over research teams and a common
ranking over student groups. The trade-o⁄ between these four properties
determines the structure of the results presented in the main body of our
work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the basic notions for our analysis. Sections 3, 4, and 5 are devoted to the
existence of core stable coalitional matchings when agents￿preferences over
universities are crucially shaped by their preferences over groups, respectively,
on one and the same market side, on their own market side, and on the
opposite market side. Each of these sections contains existence results with
respect to the outlined induced preferences and provides examples that shed
light on the importance of the identi￿ed (necessary and) su¢ cient conditions.
We conclude in Section 6 with some ￿nal remarks. An appendix contains all
the proofs of formal statements.
1We refer the reader to Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogonolnaia and Jackson (2002) for
di⁄erent su¢ cient conditions with respect to this topic and would like to note that for our
analysis it is not necessary to be more explicit on these conditions.
52 Notation and de￿nitions
Our setup consists of the following basic ingredients.
Agents and overall preferences
There are two disjoint and ￿nite sets of agents, the set R of researchers,
and the set S of students. A research team T is a non-empty subset of R
and a student group G is a non-empty subset of S. We denote by 2R the set
of all research teams, and by Rr the set of all teams containing researcher
r 2 R. Correspondingly, 2S stands for the set of all student groups, while Ss
is the set of all student groups containing student s 2 S.
Each researcher and each student seek a research/teacher team and a
student group. Thus, each student s 2 S has a complete and transitive
preference ￿s de￿ned over 2R￿Ss, and each researcher r 2 R has a complete
and transitive preference ￿r de￿ned over Rr ￿ 2S. The corresponding strict
preference and indi⁄erence relations are denoted, for i 2 R [ S, by ￿i and
￿i, respectively.
Primitive preferences
We assume that each agent￿ s overall preference over universities, i.e., over
elements of 2R ￿ 2S that contain him, are induced by two corresponding
primitive binary relations (assumed to be complete and transitive). More
precisely, for each s 2 S, these relation are ￿G
s (de￿ned over student groups
containing s) and ￿T
s (de￿ned over all research teams). Correspondingly, for
each r 2 R, the relations are ￿T
r (de￿ned over all research teams containing
r) and ￿G
r (de￿ned over all student groups). The di⁄erent ways in which this
primitive information is used to guide agents￿overall preferences shape the
domains we consider in the next sections.
Common rankings
For some of the results in the next sections to hold we need to assume
the existence of a common ranking, i.e., a complete and transitive binary
6relation DT over all research teams and of a common ranking DG over all
student groups, where the corresponding strict preference and indi⁄erence are






Z 2 fR;S;R [ Sg, satis￿es the common ranking property with respect to
DT or simply respects DT (cf. Farell and Scotchmer (1988)) if, for all i 2 Z,
T 0 ￿T





i2Z, Z 2 fR;S;R [ Sg, respects DG if, for all i 2 Z, G0 ￿G
i G00 if and
only if G0 DG G00 for all G0;G00 2 2S.
Hedonic games
In a hedonic coalition formation game each player￿ s preferences over coali-
tions depend only on the composition of members of his coalition (cf. DrŁze
and Greenberg (1980), Banerjee et al. (2001), Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002)). The model of such a game consists of a complete and transitive
preference, for each player, over the coalitions that player may belong to.
The outcome of the game is a partition of the set of players into coalitions
and it is supposed that each player compares two partitions based only on











are well de￿ned hedonic games.
The core of such games consists of such partitions for which no group of play-
ers are able to form a coalition with each player being strictly better o⁄with
this new coalition compared to his corresponding coalition in the partition.






















respectively. Moreover, since the proofs of our existence results are obtained
in a recursive manner, we need for some of them to assume that the corre-
sponding hedonic games are totally balanced. Applied to the research team
formation game, the corresponding de￿nition reads as follows. For any V ￿ R
and r 2 V , let ￿T
rjV denote the restriction of ￿T










has a non-empty core. Note ￿nally that if (￿T
r )r2R respects a













A coalitional matching is a function ￿ from R [ S into subsets of R [ S,
such that for all r 2 R and s 2 S :
(1) ￿(s) 2 2R ￿ Ss;
(2) ￿(r) 2 Rr ￿ 2S;
(3) If ￿(i) = (T;G) for some i 2 R [ S, then ￿(k) = (T;G) for all
k 2 T [ G.
In what follows, we write ￿(i) = (￿(i)1 ;￿(i)2) to denote the match of
agent i 2 R [ S under ￿.
Notice that each coalitional matching ￿ induces a partition ￿￿ of R [ S
into coalitions (universities), i.e., ￿￿ = f￿(i)1 [ ￿(i)2 j i 2 R [ Sg. For each
i 2 R[S, we denote by ￿￿ (i) the coalition containing agent i in matching ￿.
Moreover, ￿
￿
R = fV \ R j V 2 ￿￿g is a partition of R into research teams,
while ￿
￿
S = fQ \ S j Q 2 ￿￿g is a partition of S into student groups (both
partitions being induced by ￿).
We say that a pair (A;￿0), where A ￿ R [ S and ￿0 is a coalitional
matching, is blocking ￿ if
(1) For all s 2 A \ S and r 2 A \ R, ￿(s) 2 2A\R ￿ (A \ S)s and
￿(r) 2 (A \ R)r ￿ 2A\S;
(2) For all i 2 A, ￿0 (i) ￿i ￿(i).
A coalitional matching ￿ is core stable if it cannot be blocked.
3 Same-sided priorities
We start our analysis by assuming that researchers￿and students￿prefer-
ences over groups on one and the same market side shape in a crucial way
their overall preferences over universities. The ￿rst preference domain (D1)
displays a situation where both researchers and students pay attention only
8to the research teams they can work in or learn from, respectively. In the
second preference domain (D2) priority is given again to research teams but,
in case an agent is indi⁄erent between two research teams, the overall pref-
erence over universities follows the corresponding primitive preference over
student groups. Thus, we have the following formal de￿nitions.
D1 :
For all r 2 R and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 Rr ￿ 2S, (T 0;G0) ￿r (T 00;G00) i⁄
T 0 ￿T
r T 00;




For all r 2 R and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 Rr ￿ 2S, (T 0;G0) ￿r (T 00;G00) i⁄
(a) T 0 ￿T
r T 00 or (b) T 0 ￿T
r T 00 and G0 ￿G
r G00;
For all s 2 S and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 2R ￿ Ss, (T 0;G0) ￿s (T 00;G00) i⁄
(a) T 0 ￿T
s T 00 or (b) T 0 ￿T
s T 00 and G0 ￿G
s G00.
Given the focus of agents￿induced preferences in these two domains, it
is easy to see that a necessary condition for the existence of a core stable







; the reason is that all
researchers (and students) look (￿rst) at the corresponding research teams
when comparing two universities. As it turns out, the existence of a core
stable partition for the research team formation game is also a su¢ cient
condition when the domain is D1.
Theorem 1 Let (￿i)i2R[S 2 D1. Then a core stable coalitional matching






However, as exempli￿ed next, the existence of a core stable partition into
research teams does not su¢ ce for the existence of a core stable coalitional
matching when agents￿preferences are in D2. More precisely, the exam-











6= ; and agents￿primitive pref-
9erences are strict, i.e., the induced rankings over universities are strict as
well2.
Example 1 Consider a set of researchers R = fr1;r2;r3g and a set of stu-










































= ffr1g;fr2g;fr3gg. Further, any coalitional
matching such that ￿(i)2 = ; for all i 2 R is not core stable because it will
be blocked by (A;￿0) where A = fr1;s1;s3g and ￿0(i) = (fr1g;fs1;s3g) for
all i 2 A because fs1s3g ￿G
r1 ;, fr1g ￿T
s1 ;, and fr1g ￿T
s3 ;. Next, con-
sider a coalitional matching ￿ with ￿(r1) = ￿(s1) = ￿(s3) = (fr1g;fs1;s3g),
and ￿(r2)2 = ￿(r3)2 = ￿(s2)1 = ;. This matching is blocked by (A;￿0) with
A = fr3;s2;s3g and ￿0 such that ￿0(i) = (fr3g;fs2;s3g) for all i 2 A be-
cause fs2;s3g ￿G
r3 ;, fr3g ￿T
s2 ;; and fr3g ￿T
s3 fr1g. Similarly, a coalitional
matching ￿ with ￿(r3) = ￿(s2) = ￿(s3) = (fr3g;fs2;s3g), and ￿(r1)2 =
￿(r2)2 = ￿(s1)1 = ; is blocked by (A;￿0) with A = fr2;s1;s2g and ￿0 such
that ￿0(i) = (fr2g;fs1;s2g) for all i 2 A; and a coalitional matching ￿ with
￿(r2) = ￿(s1) = ￿(s2) = (fr2g;fs1;s2g) and ￿(r1)2 = ￿(r3)2 = ￿(s3)1 = ; is
blocked by (A;￿0) with A = fr1;s1;s3g and ￿0 such that ￿0(i) = (fr1g;fs1;s3g)
2In all examples, the coalitions not listed are either not individually rational (less
preferred than the corresponding singleton) or the empty set is preferred to any of them.
10for all i 2 A. In the same fashion, one can show that no other coalitional
matching is core stable.











is totally balanced. In order to prove our ex-
istence results for D2, we need to further assume a common ranking property
to hold. More precisely, we have the following result.





















DT with DT being strict. Then a core stable coalitional matching exists.





r2R containing indi⁄erences. The next exam-
ple shows a coalitional matching situation with the following four features:
(1) (￿T






tally balanced); (2) the primitive preferences (￿T
r )r2R are strict; (3) (￿G
r )r2R





is totally balanced. Never-
theless, no core stable coalitional matching exists.
Example 2 Consider a set of researchers R = fr1;r2g and a set of students
S = fs1;s2;s3g. Let (￿T

























There is no core stable coalitional matching when (￿i)i2R[S 2 D2. First,
note that fr1;r2g cannot be an element of a core stable coalitional matching
because fr1g ￿T
r1 fr1;r2g. Next, consider the coalitional matching ￿ such
11that ￿(r1)2 = fs1;s2g, ￿(s1)1 = ￿(s2)1 = fr1g and ￿(r2)2 = ￿(s3)1 = ;.
This matching is blocked by (A;￿0), with A = fr2;s2;s3g and ￿0 is such that
￿0(i) = (fr2g;fs2;s3g) for all i 2 A. Similarly, one can show that no other
coalitional matching is core stable.
In order to see that it is crucial that both (￿T







r2R contains indi⁄erences, let us consider a situation where
(1) (￿T
















is totally balanced; (4) (￿T
s )s2S respects DT.
Example 3 Let R = fr1;r2;r3g, S = fs1g and (￿T














r )r2R respect fs1g BG ; and ￿T
s1 respect fr2;r3g BT fr1;r2g BT
fr1;r3g BT ; DT :::.
In this situation there is no core stable coalitional matching when (￿i)i2R[S 2
D2. Consider the coalitional matching ￿(r1) = ￿(r2) = ￿(s1) = (fr1;r2g;s1),
￿(r3) = (fr3g;;). This matching is blocked by (A;￿0) with A = fr2;r3;s1g
and ￿(i) = (fr1;r2g;s1) for all i 2 A because fr2;r3g ￿T
r2 fr1;r2g, fr2;r3g ￿T
r3
fr3g, fs1g ￿G
r3 ;, and fr2;r3g ￿T
s1 fr1;r2g. Next consider the coalitional
matching ￿(r1) = (fr1g;;), ￿(r2) = ￿(r3) = ￿(s1) = (fr2;r3g;s1). This
matching is blocked by (A;￿0) with A = fr1;r3g because fr1;r3g ￿T
r1 fr1g and
fr1;r3g ￿T
r3 fr2;r3g. Similarly, one can show that no coalitional matching is
core stable.
As we show next, if, in addition to the properties of a coalitional match-
ing problem outlined in the above example, one requires (￿G
s )s2S also to
respect the common ranking over student groups, then a core stable coali-











s2S are required to respect the corresponding com-






















spect DG. Then a core stable coalitional matching exists.
Our ￿nal example in this section shows the importance of the fact that
the hedonic games on both market sides have to be totally balanced for the











has a nonempty core but





i2R[S respects DG, there may not be a
core stable coalitional matching.
Example 4 Consider a set of researchers R = fr1;r2;r3;r4;r5g and a set of

































s2S respect fr2;r3g BT fr3g BT
; DT :::.
There is no core stable coalitional matching when (￿i)i2R[S 2 D2. First no-






￿R = ffr1;r2g;fr3g;fr4;r5gg, so no coalitional matching that induces a par-
tition of the researcher set di⁄erent from ￿R can be core stable. Next, con-
sider the coalitional matching ￿ de￿ned by ￿(r1) = ￿(r2) = (fr1;r2g;;),
￿(r3) = ￿(s1) = (fr3g;fs1g), and ￿(r4) = ￿(r5) = (fr4;r5g;;). This
matching is blocked by the pair (A;￿0) with A = fr2;r3;s1g and ￿0 such
that ￿0(i) = (fr2;r3g;fs1g) for all i 2 A, because fr1;r2g ￿T
r2 fr2;r3g and
13fs1g ￿G
r2 ;, fr2;r3g ￿T
r3 fr3g, and fr2;r3g ￿T
s1 fr3g. Similarly, one can show
that no other coalitional matching is core stable.
4 Own-sided priorities
Assume next that agents￿preferences over universities are mainly shaped by
the corresponding primitive preferences over groups on agents￿own market
side. For the domain D3 these primitive preferences dictate the overall pref-
erences, while for D4 the primitive preferences over groups on the opposite
market side also play a role.
D3 :
For all s 2 S and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 2R ￿ Ss, (T 0;G0) ￿s (T 00;G00) i⁄
G0 ￿G
s G00;




For all s 2 S and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 2R ￿ Ss, (T 0;G0) ￿s (T 00;G00) i⁄
(a) G0 ￿G
s G00 or (b) G0 ￿G
s G00 and T 0 ￿T
s T 00;
For all r 2 R and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 Rr ￿ 2S, (T 0;G0) ￿r (T 00;G00) i⁄
(a) T 0 ￿T
r T 00 or (b) T 0 ￿T
r T 00 and G0 ￿G
r G00.
Again, it is easy to see from the de￿nitions of these two preference do-
mains that a necessary condition for the existence of a core stable coalitional















The non-emptiness of the cores of these two coalition formation games turns
out to be a su¢ cient condition when the domain is D3.
Theorem 4 Let (￿i)i2R[S 2 D3. Then a core stable coalitional matching











Surprisingly, the non-emptiness of the two cores is necessary and su¢ cient
for the existence of a core stable coalitional matching also when the domain
14is D4, provided that agents￿preferences in the corresponding hedonic games
are strict. The main reason for this result is that when research teams and
student groups from two corresponding core stable partitions are matched,
then the agent set in a blocking pair contains, along with an agent, also his
coalition from the corresponding core stable partition. This fact, together
with the properties of the preference domain, allows us to replace coalitions
by players and then identify a stable matching in the corresponding standard
two-sided matching problem. In turn, this stable matching induces in a
natural way a core stable coalitional matching.










s2S be strict. Then












However, in the presence of indi⁄erences, one has similar problems to
those identi￿ed in the previous section. Recall that Example 3 shows a situ-
ation with the following features: (1) there are indi⁄erences in the preference
pro￿le (￿T












r )r2R respects DG and (￿T
s )s2S respects DT. One can easily
check that with (￿i)i2R[S 2 D4, no core stable coalitional matching exists.
Again, the corresponding common rankings have to be respected by all agents
in order such a matching to exists.











respect DG. Then a core stable coalitional matching exists.
5 Opposite-sided priorities
Finally, we consider a situation where the primitive preferences over groups
from the opposite market side play the leading role in agents￿overall pref-
erences: for D5, this leading role is a dictatorial one, while for D6 agents￿
primitive preferences over groups from their own market side are also taken
15into account.
D5 :
For all s 2 S and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 2R ￿ Ss, (T 0;G0) ￿s (T 00;G00) i⁄
T 0 ￿T
s T 00;




For all s 2 S and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 2R ￿ Ss, (T 0;G0) ￿s (T 00;G00) i⁄
(a) T 0 ￿T
s T 00 or (b) T 0 ￿T
s T 00 and G0 ￿G
s G00;
For all r 2 R and (T 0;G0);(T 00;G00) 2 Rr ￿ 2S, (T 0;G0) ￿r (T 00;G00) i⁄
(a) G0 ￿G
r G00 or (b) G0 ￿G
r G00 and T 0 ￿T
r T 00.
Notice that the properties of the corresponding hedonic games do not
play any role when agents￿preferences are in D5.











DG. Then a core stable coalitional matching exists.
As exempli￿ed below it is crucial the existing common rankings to be
respected by the agents from both market sides. The example shows that if
(￿G
r )r2R respects DG but (￿T
s )s2S does not respect a common ranking over
research teams, there might not be a core stable coalitional matching when
(￿i)i2R[S 2 D5.
Example 5 Let R = fr1;r2;r3g and S = fs1;s2;s3g. Let (￿G
r )r2R respect
fs1;s2g BG fs1;s3g BG fs2;s3g BG ; DG :::, and (￿T
s )s2S be as follows:
fr1;r2g ￿T
s1 fr1g ￿T
s1 ;; fr3g ￿T
s2 fr1;r2g ￿T
s2 ;; fr1g ￿T
s3 fr3g ￿T
s3 ;:
There is no core stable coalitional matching when (￿i)i2R[S 2 D5. First
note that in any coalitional matching ￿ with ￿(s1)1 = ￿(s2)1 = ￿(s3)1 =
￿(r1)2 = ￿(r2)2 = ￿(r3)2 = ; the pair (A;￿0)) with A = fr3;s2;s3g and
￿0(s2)1 = ￿0(s3)1 = fr3g blocks ￿. Next consider the coalitional matching
16￿(s1)1 = ￿(s2)1 = fr1;r2g, ￿(s3)1 = ;, ￿(r1)2 = ￿(r2)2 = fs1;s2g, ￿(r3)2 =
;: it is blocked by the pair (A;￿0) with A = fr3;s2;s3g and ￿0(s2)1 = ￿0(s3) =
fr3g, ￿0(r3)2 = fs2;s3g. Further consider the coalitional matching ￿(s1)1 =
;, ￿(s2)1 = ￿(s3)1 = fr3g, ￿(r1)2 = ￿(r2)2 = ;, ￿(r3)2 = fs2;s3g: it is
blocked by the pair (A;￿0) with A = fr1;s1;s3g and ￿0(s1)1 = ￿0(s3)1 = fr1g,
￿0(r1)2 = fs1;s3g. Last consider the coalitional matching ￿(s1)1 = ￿(s3)1 =
fr1g, ￿(s2)1 = ;, ￿(r1)2 = fs1s3g, ￿(r2)2 = ￿(r3)2 = ;: it is blocked by the
pair (A;￿0) with A = fr1;r2;s1;s2g and ￿0(s1)1 = ￿0(s2)1 = fr1;r2g, and
￿0(r1)2 = ￿0(r2)2 = fs1;s2g. All other matchings ￿ can shown to be blocked
because at least one agent prefers to be matched to the empty set than to the
coalition with which he is matched under ￿.
Although the properties of the corresponding coalition formation games
do not play any role when the domain is D5, these properties are crucial when
agents￿preferences over universities are in D6 and especially in the presence










are totally balanced, (￿G
r )r2R respects DG, (￿T
s )s2S respects
DT, and there are indi⁄erences in either DT or DG.
Example 6 Let the set of researchers be R = fr1;r2g and the set of students
S = fs1;s2;s3g. Let the primitive preferences (￿T
r )r2R and (￿G
s )s2S be as
follows:
fr1g ￿T















s )s2S respect fr1g =T fr2g BT ;, and (￿G
r )r2R respect fs1;s2g BG
fs1;s3g BG fs2;s3g BG ; DG :::.
There is not stable coalitional matching when (￿i)i2R[S 2 D6. Consider
the coalitional matching ￿(r1) = ￿(s1) = ￿(s2) = (fr1g;fs1;s2g), ￿(r2) =
(fr2g;;), and ￿(s3) = (;;fs3g). This coalitional matching is blocked by the
17pair (A;￿0) with A = fr2;s2;s3g and ￿0 such that ￿0(i) = (fr2g;fs2;s3g)
because fs2;s3g ￿G
r2 ;, r1 ￿T
s2 r2 and fs2;s3g ￿G
s2 fs1;s2g, and fr2g ￿T
r3 ;.
Similarly, one can show that no other coalitional matching is core stable.
In view of the above example, we obtain the following result.




















r2R respect DG with
both DT and DG being strict. Then a core stable coalitional matching exists.
As we show in our ￿nal result, when we allow for indi⁄erences in the
common rankings, then a core stable coalitional matching exists if all agents￿
preferences respect the corresponding common rankings.











respect DG. Then a core stable coalitional matching exists.
6 Conclusion
The framework of coalitional matching enables us to study situations in which
groups of agents are being formed on both sides of a market. It is recognized
that an agent￿ s preferences on either side of the market depend on his peers
on the same side and on the identity of the agents with whom he is matched
on the other side. In this context, we derive existence results for a num-
ber of possible lexicographic preferences pro￿les. These results allow us to
see more clearly the connections between the ways in which agents￿overall
preferences are induced and the outlined su¢ cient conditions. Given the ex-
istence of core stable partitions on one of the market sides and the existence
of a totally balanced game on the other, we highlight the trade-o⁄ between
agents￿preferences being strict and satisfying a corresponding common rank-
ing property.
The latter property is admittedly restrictive, however, quite realistic. For
instance, we observe in many industries the emergence of o¢ cial rankings of
18institutions or participants, e.g., standardized tests such as SAT, GRE, and
GMAT are used to rank students for admissions to universities. Worldwide
rankings of academic institutions are produced to facilitate comparison be-
tween departments and facilitate academic job seekers (cf. Baltagi (2003) and
Neary et al. (2003)). Moreover, in many countries local university ranking
tables are developed which are then used by governments to allocate research
funds and prospective students in higher education (see, e.g., Dill and Soo
(2005)).
To illustrate our concepts, throughout this paper, we have used the ex-
ample of students and researchers forming universities. The proposed frame-
work, however, has a wider applicability and can be also used to study, for
instance, hospital formations by medical sta⁄and patient groups, sport club
formation by athletes and coaching teams, and editorial boards and authors
make up journals.
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each coalitional matching can be blocked. Fix a coalitional matching ￿ and
let ￿
￿








, there exists A ￿ R such that A ￿T
r ￿
￿
R (r) for all r 2 A.
De￿ne the coalitional matching ￿0 by ￿0 (r) = (A;;) for all r 2 A. Since
(￿r)r2R 2 D1, the pair (A;￿0) is a blocking for ￿.











. We construct in what follows a core stable coalitional
matching. For each s 2 S, let Ts 2 ￿ [ f;g be such that Ts ￿T
s T 0 for all
T 0 2 ￿. Further, for each T 0 2 ￿ [ f;g, de￿ne ST0 := fs 2 S : Ts = T 0g.
Consider the coalitional matching ￿ de￿ned as follows:
(1) For all k = 1;:::;K, ￿(s) =
￿
Tk;STk￿




for all s 2 S;,
(3) For all k = 1;:::;K, ￿(r) =
￿
Tk;STk￿
for all r 2 Tk.
We show that there is no blocking for ￿. Let, on the contrary, (A;￿0) be
such a blocking. If A\R 6= ;, then, for r 2 A\R, ￿0 (r)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1 = ￿(r0)










. If A ￿ S and ￿0 (s)1 6= ; for some s 2 A then, by
(￿r)r2R 2 D1 and in order that all researchers in ￿0 (s)1 are strictly better
o⁄ under ￿0, we would have ; 6= ￿0 (s)1 ￿T
r ￿(r)1 = ￿(r) for all r 2 ￿0 (s)1.










Hence, ￿0 (s)1 = ; should hold for all s 2 A ￿ S. Notice however that, by
construction of ￿, ￿(s)1 ￿T
s ; = ￿0 (s)1 for all s 2 [K
k=1STk and ￿(s)1 = ; for




. Thus, it is impossible that (A;￿0) blocks ￿.
Proof of Theorem 2. We construct a core stable coalitional matching.





be such that Tk BT Tk+1 for
all k = 1;:::;K ￿ 1, and let q = min
￿
k 2 f1;:::;Kg j Tk BT ;
￿
. Let ￿S
be a collection of M > 0 student groups which are pairwise disjoint and
whose union is S and suppose that, w.l.o.g., q ￿ M. The collection ￿S
22is constructed as follows. De￿ne S0 := S, G0 := ; and let, for all l 2
f1;:::;qg, Gl ￿ Sl := Sl￿1 n Gl￿1 be such that Gl ￿G
r G0 for some r 2 Tl






with Q := S n ([
q
l=1Gl). We show
now that the coalitional matching ￿ de￿ned by
(1) ￿(i) = (Tk;Gk) for all i 2 Tk [ Gk and all k ￿ q,
(2) ￿(s) = (;;Gk) for all s 2 Gk and all k 2 fq + 1;:::;Mg,
(3) ￿(r) = (Tk;;) for all r 2 Tk and all k 2 fq + 1;:::;Kg
is core stable.
Suppose on the contrary that there is a blocking (A;￿0) for ￿. If A ￿ S,
then there cannot be a student s 2 A such that ￿(s) = (Tk;Gk) with k ￿ q;
the reason is that, in view of the construction of ￿, Tk BT ; = ￿0 (s)1 would
imply (Tk;Gk) ￿T
s (;;￿0 (s)2) which is a contradiction to (A;￿0) being a
blocking for ￿. If A ￿ S and each student s 2 A is such that ￿(s) =
(;;Gks) for some ks 2 fq + 1;:::;Mg, then ￿0 (s) = (;;￿0 (s)2) ￿T
s (;;Gks)
for all s 2 A is only possible if ￿0 (s)2 ￿G
s Gks for all s 2 A. Notice also
that ￿(s) = (;;Gks) for some ks 2 fq + 1;:::;Mg and all s 2 A implies
s 2 S n ([
q







Suppose now that A ￿ R and A 62 ￿R. Take r0 2 A and note that it
must be the case of ￿(r0)1 ￿T
r ￿R (r) for all r 2 ￿(r0)1 because (￿r)r2R 2 D2
and the primitive preferences (￿T
r )r2R are strict. Thus, ￿(r0)1 blocks ￿R in






Last, suppose that A = Tk [ G0 with Tk 2 ￿R and G0 ￿ S. Notice ￿rst
that, in order (A;￿0) to be a blocking pair for ￿, one should have ￿0 (r)1 =
Tk for all r 2 Tk; otherwise, ￿0 (r)1 ￿ Tk for some r 2 Tk would imply,
by (￿r)r2R 2 D2 and the primitive preferences (￿T
r )r2R being strict, that
￿0 (r)1 ￿T
r0 Tk for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1. In the latter case ￿0 (r)1 would block ￿R in






Notice further that ￿0 (r)1 = Tk for all r 2 Tk requires, in order all
23researchers in Tk to be strictly better o⁄ under ￿0, that ￿0 (r)2 ￿G
r ￿(r)2 for
all r 2 Tk.
If k 2 f1;:::;qg, then by de￿nition of ￿ there exists at least one researcher
rk 2 Tk such that ￿(rk)2 = Gk ￿G
r G0 for all G0 2 2[M
m=kGm; hence, rk would







. However, it follows from ￿0 (rk)1 = Tk and srk 2 ￿0 (rk)2





s2S respects DT with DT being strict, we have that ￿(srk)1 = Tk0 ￿T
srk
Tk = ￿0 (srk)1. Thus, (A;￿0) cannot block ￿.
If k 2 fq+1;:::;Kg, then ￿(r) = (Tk;;) for all r 2 Tk and ￿(s) = (;;Gk)
with k 2 fq + 1;:::;Mg for all s 2 G0. Notice ￿rst that, by the de￿nition











. Then, in order all researchers in A (i.e., in Tk) to be
strictly better o⁄ under ￿0, one should have ￿0 (r)2 ￿G
r ; for all r 2 Tk since,
as already shown, ￿0 (r)1 = Tk for all r 2 Tk = A \ R. Suppose that this
is indeed the case. Notice ￿rst that, for all r 2 Tk, we have ; 6= ￿0 (r)2 ￿
G0 and ￿0 (r)1 = Tk = ￿0 (sr)1 for all sr 2 ￿0 (r)2. Thus, there are two
possibilities for sr 2 ￿0 (r)2 to strictly better o⁄under ￿0. The ￿rst one is that
￿0 (sr)1 = Tk ￿T






respecting DT and the de￿nition of q, there is no s 2 S such that Tk ￿T
s ;.
Hence, the only remaining second possibility for sr 2 ￿0 (r)2 to be strictly
better o⁄ under ￿0 (and hence, the only possibility for all sr 2 ￿0 (r)2 to be
strictly better o⁄ under ￿0) is that one has ￿0 (sr)1 = Tk ￿T
s ; = ￿(sr)1 and
￿0 (sr)2 ￿G






DT and DT being strict.
Proof of Theorem 3. We construct a core stable coalitional matching. Let
￿R = fT1;:::;TKg be a partition of R with Tk DT T 0 for all T 0 2 2Rk for all
k 2 f1;:::;Kg, where R0 := R, T0 := ;, Tk ￿ Rk := Rk￿1 n Tk￿1. Similarly,
let ￿S = fG1;:::;GMg be a partition of S with Gm DG G0 for all G0 2 2Sm
for all m 2 f1;:::;Mg, where S0 := S, G0 := ;, Gm ￿ Sm := Sm￿1 n Gm￿1.











let qR = minfk 2 f1;:::;Kg j Tk BT ;g, qS = minfm 2 f1;:::;Mg j
Gm BG ;g, and suppose, w.l.o.g., that qR ￿ qS. We show now that the
coalitional matching ￿ de￿ned by
(1) ￿(i) = (Tk;Gk) for all i 2 Tk [ Gk and all k ￿ qR,
(2) ￿(s) = (;;Gk) for all s 2 Gk and all k 2 fqR + 1;:::;Mg,
(3) ￿(r) = (Tk;;) for all r 2 Tk and all k 2 fqR + 1;:::;Kg
is core stable.
Suppose on the contrary that there is a blocking pair (A;￿0) for ￿. First,
suppose that A ￿ R. Fix r 2 A and note that, since (￿r)r2R 2 D2, we should
have, for each r0 2 ￿0 (r)1 ￿ A, either ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0)
or ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0) and ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0
￿(r0)2. If ￿0 (r)1 ￿T
r0 ￿R (r0) holds for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1, then ￿0 (r)1 blocks





. Therefore, there must be
a researcher r0 2 ￿0 (r)1 with ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0) and
￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2. Note that it must be that ￿(r0)2 6= ; which,






r2R respects DG, we have ; BG Gkr0 which is a contradiction to
the de￿nition of qR and kr0 ￿ qR ￿ qS.
Next, suppose that A ￿ S. Fix s 2 A and note that, since (￿s)s2S 2 D2,
we should have, for each s0 2 ￿0(s)2 ￿ A, either ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0
￿(s0)1 or ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0 ￿(s0)1 and ￿0(s)2 = ￿0(s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 =
￿S (s0). Note ￿rst that, by construction of ￿, ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0






s2S respects DT, we have ; BT Tks0 which is a contradiction to the
de￿nition of qR and ks0 ￿ qR. Therefore, for all s0 2 ￿0(s)2 ￿ A it must be
that ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0 ￿(s0)1 and ￿0(s)2 = ￿0(s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 = ￿S (s0).






Last, suppose that A\R 6= ; and A\S 6= ;. If A\T1 6= ; then ￿(r)2 = G1










r2R respects DG, and
25by construction T1 DT T 0 for all T 0 2 2R and G1 DG G0 for all G0 2 2S, it is
not possible, by (￿r)r2R 2 D2, that r 2 A\T1 is strictly better o⁄ under ￿0.
By an analogous argument, no student in A\G1 can be made strictly better
o⁄ under ￿0. Hence, we should have A ￿ (R n T1) [ (S n G1).
Similarly, for k 2 f2;3;:::;qRg, we can show that A \ Tk = ; and

















over, for all r;s 2 A holds then ￿(r)2 = ; and ￿(s)1 = ;. Since by de￿nition








it follows that ￿0(s)1 ￿T
s ￿(s)1 holds for all s 2 A. Fix s 2 A and notice
that, in order ￿0 to be a blocking for ￿, it must be, for all s0 2 ￿0(s)2 ￿ A,
that ￿0(s)2 = ￿0(s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 = Gks0 for some ks0 2 fqR + 1;:::;Mg.



















with Sq = S n [
qR
k=1Gk. Hence, A
does not contain any students. By an analogous argument, and since both
researchers￿and students￿primitive preference over student groups respect
DG, A does not contain any researcher either. We conclude then that no
blocking for ￿ exists.











Since (￿i)i2R[S 2 D3, it is trivial to see that the coalitional matching ￿ de-















already shown in the ￿rst part of the proof of Theorem 1, a blocking for ￿
does exist in this case.






;, then each coalitional matching can be blocked. Fix a coalitional matching
￿ and let ￿
￿
R is the partition of R into research teams induced by ￿. Since
￿
￿









all r 2 A. De￿ne the matching ￿0 by ￿0 (r) = (A;;) for all r 2 A. Since
(￿r)r2R 2 D4, the pair (A;￿0) is a blocking for ￿.











and we show that a core stable coalitional matching exists. In particular, we
will show that the existence of such a matching follows from the existence
of a stable matching in a standard two-sided matching problem as shown by
Sotomayor (1996).











. Let ￿ be a coalitional matching of the following type: for
all r 2 R, ￿(r)1 = ￿R (r) and ￿(r)2 = ￿S (s) [ ; for some s 2 S; for all
s 2 S, ￿(s)2 = ￿S (s) and ￿(s)1 = ￿R (r) [ ; for some r 2 R. Suppose that
(A;￿0) is a blocking for ￿.
We show ￿rst that if A \ R 6= ;, then ￿R (r) ￿ A and ￿0 (r)1 = ￿R (r)
for all r 2 A. Fix r 2 A and note that, since (￿r)r2R 2 D4, we should have,
for each r0 2 ￿0 (r)1 ￿ A, either ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0) or
￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0) and ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2. If
￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿R (r0) holds for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1, then ￿0 (r)1 would be blocking





. Therefore, there must be
a researcher r0 2 ￿0 (r)1 with ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T





r2R is a pro￿le of strict preferences, we have then ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 =
￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0). Thus, we have r 2 ￿(r0)1 and hence, ￿0 (r)1 = ￿R (r0) =
￿R (r) ￿ A. Similarly, one can conclude that for all s 2 A, ￿S (s) ￿ A and
￿0 (s)2 = ￿S (s).
For each Tk 2 ￿R, ￿x rTk 2 Tk and for each Gm 2 ￿S, ￿x sGm 2 Gm.
Let R￿R = frT1;:::;rTKg and S￿S = fsG1;:::;sGMg. For each rTk 2 R￿R,
let ￿rTk be a complete and transitive preference relation on S￿S [ frTkg
de￿ned as follows: for all m1;m2 2 f1;:::;Mg, sGm1 ￿rTk sGm2 if and only
if Gm1 ￿G
rTk Gm2 and, for all m 2 f1;:::;Mg, rTk ￿rTk sGm if and only if
; ￿G
rTk Gm. For each sGm 2 S￿S, let ￿sGm be a complete and transitive
preference relation on R￿R [fsGmg de￿ned in an analogous way. Notice then
that the sets R￿R and S￿S together with the corresponding preferences form
a well de￿ned standard two-sided matching problem. As shown by Gale and
27Shapley (1962) and Sotomayor (1996), a stable matching in this problem
always exists.
Take now a stable matching ￿ in the two-sided matching problem de-
scribed above. Notice that ￿ induces a coalitional matching ￿￿ as follows: for










= rTk. We show that ￿￿ is core stable.
Suppose on the contrary that there is a blocking (B;￿00) for ￿￿. From
the analysis above we know that for all r 2 B, ￿00(r)1 = ￿￿(r)1 = ￿R(r).
Therefore, for ￿00 to be blocking ￿￿, it must be that ￿00 (r)2 ￿G
r ￿￿(r)2 2 ￿S[
f;g holds for all r 2 B and in particular for r￿R(r) 2 ￿R(r) with ￿R(r) ￿ B.












= sGm. Similarly, we have ￿00(s)2 = ￿￿(s)2 = ￿S(s) and thus,
￿00 (s)1 ￿T
s ￿￿(s)1 2 ￿R [ f;g should hold for all s 2 B and, in particular,













First consider the case when B ￿ R. The analysis above implies that for
some r￿R(r) 2 ￿R(r) with ￿R(r) ￿ B, it holds that ￿00 ￿
r￿R(r)
￿





2 is possible only if ￿￿ ￿
r￿R(r)
￿





= sGm. By construction, we have then r￿R(r) >r￿R(r) sGm (i.e.,
r￿R(r) prefers to stay alone than to be matched (as he is under ￿) to sGm)
in contradiction to the fact that ￿ is stable for the above de￿ned standard
two-sided matching problem.
Next consider the case when B ￿ S. The analysis above implies that








1 is possible only if ￿￿ ￿
s￿S(s)
￿





= rTk. By construction, we have then s￿S(s) >s￿S(s) rTk (i.e.,
s￿S(s) prefers to stay alone than to be matched (as he is under ￿) to rTk)
in contradiction to the fact that ￿ is stable for the above de￿ned standard
two-sided matching problem.
28Last consider the case when B \ R 6= ; and B \ S 6= ;. The analy-
sis above again implies that there are r￿R(r) 2 ￿R(r) with ￿R(r) ￿ B and
s￿S(s) 2 ￿S(s) with ￿S(s) ￿ B such that ￿00 ￿
r￿R(r)
￿







2 = ￿￿ ￿
s￿S(s)
￿
2. Moreover, for (B;￿00) to be blocking ￿￿ it must
also hold that ￿00 ￿
r￿R(r)
￿
2 = ￿￿ ￿
s￿S(s)
￿
2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
r￿R(r)
￿







1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
s￿S(s)
￿
1. Since by construction ￿￿ ￿
r￿R(r)
￿
2 = Gm 2
￿S [ f;g with ￿(r￿R(r)) = sGm and ￿￿ ￿
s￿S(s)
￿
1 = Tk 2 ￿R [ f;g with
￿(s￿S(s)) = rTk, this implies that s￿S(s) >r￿R(r) sGm and r￿R(r) >s￿S(s) rTk
in contradiction to the fact that ￿ is stable for the above de￿ned standard
two-sided matching problem.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let ￿ be the coalitional matching constructed in
the proof of Theorem 3. If there is a blocking pair (A;￿0) for ￿, then
notice that reaching a contradiction goes in the same way as in the cor-
responding parts of the proof of Theorem 3, except for A ￿ S. For this
case, ￿x s 2 A and note that, since (￿s)s2S 2 D4, we should have, for
each s0 2 ￿0 (s)2 ￿ A, either ￿0 (s)2 = ￿0 (s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 = ￿S (s0) or
￿0 (s)2 = ￿0 (s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 = ￿S (s0) and ￿0 (s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0 ￿(s0)1.
If ￿0 (s)2 ￿G
s0 ￿S (s0) holds for all s0 2 ￿0 (s)2, then ￿0 (s)2 blocks ￿S in con-





. Therefore, there must be a student
s0 2 ￿0 (s)2 with ￿0 (s)2 = ￿0 (s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 = ￿S (s0) and ￿0 (s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 =
; ￿T
s0 ￿(s0)1. Note that it must be that ￿(s0)1 6= ; which, by construction of






DT, we have ; BT Tks0 which is a contradiction to the de￿nition of qR and
ks0 ￿ qR.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let fT1;:::;TKg be a collection of research teams
which are pairwise disjoint and [K
k=1Tk = R with Tk DT T 0 for all k =






, and let fG1;:::;GLg be a collec-
tion of student groups which are pairwise disjoint and [L
l=1Gl = S with






. Further, let qR =
min
￿
k 2 f1;:::;Kg j Tk BT ;
￿
and qS = min
￿
l 2 f1;:::;Lg j Gl BG ;
￿
,
29and suppose, w.l.o.g., that qR ￿ qS. We show that the coalitional matching
￿ de￿ned by




















Suppose on the contrary that there is a blocking pair (A;￿0) for ￿. First,
suppose that A ￿ R. Since (￿r)r2R 2 D5, we should have ￿0 (r)2 = ; ￿G
r
￿(r)2 for all r 2 A. Note that it must be that ￿(r)2 6= ; which, by construc-






respects DG, we have ; BG Gqr which is a contradiction to the de￿nition of
qR and qr ￿ qR ￿ qS.
Next, suppose that A ￿ S. Since (￿s)s2S 2 D5, we should have ￿0(s)1 =
; ￿T
s ￿(s)1 for all s 2 A. Note that it must be that ￿(s)1 6= ; which, by





r2R respects DT, we have ; BT Tqs which is a contradiction to the
de￿nition of qR and qs ￿ qR.
Last, suppose that A\R 6= ; and A\S 6= ;. If A\T1 6= ; then ￿(r)2 = G1










r2R respects DG, and
by construction T1 DT T 0 for all T 0 2 2R and G1 DG G0 for all G0 2 2S, it is
not possible, by (￿r)r2R 2 D5, that r 2 A \ T1 be strictly better o⁄ under
￿0. By an analogous argument, no student in A \ G1 can be made strictly
better o⁄ under ￿0. Hence, we should have A ￿ (R n T1) [ (S n G1).
Similarly, for q 2 f2;:::;qRg, we can show that A\Tq = ; and A\Gq =
















. Moreover, for all
r;s 2 A holds then ￿(r)2 = ; and ￿(s)1 = ;. Since by de￿nition ; DT T 0 for







s2S respects DT, it follows that
￿0(s)1 ￿T
s ￿(s)1 holds for all s 2 A. Hence, A does not contain any students.
By an analogous argument, A does not contain any researcher either. We
conclude then that no blocking for ￿ exists.
30Proof of Theorem 8. We construct a core stable coalitional matching. Let
fT1;:::;TKg be a collection of research teams which are pairwise disjoint
and [K






, and fG1;:::;GLg be a collection of student groups which are
pairwise disjoint and [L
l=1Gl = S with Gl BG G0 for all l = 1;:::;L and all






. Further, let qR = min
￿





l 2 f1;:::;Lg j Gl BG ;
￿
, and suppose, w.l.o.g., that qR ￿ qS.
Let Q := S n [
qR
l=1Gl, V := R n [
qR












We show that the coalitional matching ￿ de￿ned by










for all r 2 V
is core stable.
Suppose on the contrary that there is a blocking pair (A;￿0) for ￿. First,
suppose that A ￿ R. Fix r 2 A and note that, since (￿r)r2R 2 D6 and
the common ranking over research teams is linear, we should have, for each
r0 2 ￿0 (r)1 ￿ A, either ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2 or ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 =
; = ￿(r0)2 and ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1. If ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0





r2R respects BG, we
have ; BG ￿(r0)2 6= ;. However, ￿(r0)2 6= ; implies that r0 2 Tqr0 for some
qr0 ￿ qR which is not possible, since, by the construction of ￿, the de￿nition
of qS and qR ￿ qS, we have that ￿(r0)2 BG ;. Therefore, there must be the
case that for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1, ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; = ￿(r0)2 and ￿0 (r)1 =
￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1. Note that ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; = ￿(r0)2 for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1
implies, by the construction of ￿, that ￿(r0)1 = ￿V (r0) for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1.










Next, suppose that A ￿ S. Fix s 2 A and note that, since (￿s)s2S 2 D6
and the common ranking over student groups is linear, we should have, for
each s0 2 ￿0(s)2 ￿ A, either ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0 ￿(s0)1 or ￿0(s)1 =
31￿0 (s0)1 = ; = ￿(s0)1 and ￿0(s)2 = ￿0(s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2. Note ￿rst that, by
construction of ￿, ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; ￿T
s0 ￿(s0)1 6= ; can hold for some






we have ; BT Tqs0 which is a contradiction to the de￿nition of qR and ks0 ￿ qR.
Therefore, for all s0 2 ￿0(s)2 ￿ A it must be that ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; = ￿(s0)1
and ￿0(s)2 = ￿0(s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2. Note that ￿0(s)1 = ￿0 (s0)1 = ; = ￿(s0)1 for all
s0 2 ￿0(s)2 implies, by the construction of ￿, that ￿(s0)2 = ￿Q (s0) for all s0 2






Last, suppose that A \ R 6= ; and A \ S 6= ;. If A \ T1 6= ; then





r2R respects the linear common
ranking BG, (￿r)r2R 2 D6, and by construction G1 BG G0 for all G0 2 2S,
r 2 A \ T1 can be made better o⁄ under ￿0 only if ￿0(r)2 = G1 = ￿(r)2
and ￿0(r)1 ￿T






s2S respects the linear common ranking BT, (￿s)s2S 2 D6 and by
construction T1 BG T 0 for all T 0 2 2R, we should have ￿0(s)1 = T1 = ￿(s)1 and
￿0(s)2 ￿G
s ￿(s)2 = G1 in order that all s 2 G1 = ￿0(r)2 = ￿(r)2 to be strictly
better o⁄under ￿0. Thus, we have ￿0(r)2 = G1 for r 2 A\T1 and ￿0(s)1 = T1
for all s 2 G1. The latter fact implies however that ￿0(s) = (T1;G1) = ￿(s)
for all s 2 G1 ￿ A in contradiction to (A;￿) being a blocking for ￿. We
conclude that A\T1 = ;. By an analogous argument, A\G1 = ; holds too.
Hence, we should have A ￿ (R n T1) [ (S n G1).
Similarly, for k 2 f2;:::;qRg, we can show that A\Tk = ; and A\Gk =
















. Moreover, for all
r;s 2 A holds then ￿(r)2 = ; and ￿(s)1 = ;. Since by de￿nition ; BT T 0 for







s2S respects the linear common
ranking .T, it follows that ￿0(s)1 = ￿(s)1 = ; holds for all s 2 A. Fix
s 2 A and notice that, in order ￿0 to be a blocking for ￿, it must be, for
each s0 2 ￿0(s)2 ￿ A, that ￿0(s)2 = ￿0(s0)2 ￿G
s0 ￿(s0)2 = ￿Q (s0). The latter






Hence, A does not contain any students. By an analogous argument, A does
32not contain any researcher either. We conclude then that no blocking for ￿
exists.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let ￿ be the coalitional matching constructed in the
proof of Theorem 3. If there is a blocking pair (A;￿0) for ￿, then notice that
reaching a contradiction goes in the same way as in the corresponding parts
of the proof of Theorem 3, except for A ￿ R. For this case, ￿x r 2 A and
note that, since (￿r)r2R 2 D6, we should have, for each r0 2 ￿0 (r)1 ￿ A,
either ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2 or ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2 and
￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1. If ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2 6= ; holds for





r2R respects DG, we have ; BG ￿(r0)2 6= ;.
However, ￿(r0)2 6= ; implies that r0 2 Tqr0 for some qr0 ￿ qR which is not
possible, since, by the construction of ￿, the de￿nition of qS and qR ￿ qS,
we have that ￿(r0)2 BG ;. Therefore, there must be the case that for all
r0 2 ￿0 (r)1, ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G
r0 ￿(r0)2 and ￿0 (r)1 = ￿0 (r0)1 ￿T
r0 ￿(r0)1.
Note that ￿0 (r)2 = ￿0 (r0)2 = ; ￿G





r2R respects DG, that ; =G ￿(r0)2 holds for all r0 2 ￿0 (r)1. Thus, by
the construction of ￿, we have ￿(r0)1 = ￿R (r0) for all r0 2 ￿0 (r); hence,
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